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Abstract:  Global recession is likely to hit the skilled sector or the so-called white goods, 
white collared sector in a typical developing economy.  In this paper we try to analyze the 
impact of such an event on informal wage as the vast majority of the workforce in the 
developing world is employed in the unorganized or informal sector. In particular, we 
demonstrate the analytical possibility that a recession in the skilled sector will actually 
increase real informal wage. 
 
Keywords: Recession, skill, capital-labor ratio, informal wage, general equilibrium 
JEL Classification:  E31, J21, J31                 
 
 
Corresponding Address: 
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta 
R-1, B. P. Township, Kolkata 700 094, India 
Ph. +91-33-2462 7252/5794/5795. Fax. +91-33-2462 6183. 
E-mail: saibal@cssscal.org  
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
  A large body of literature has been devoted to the analysis of the informal/ 
unorganized sectors in developing and transition economies all around the globe.  Issues 
pertaining to absolute and relative informal wage, employment, output and productivity 
growth in unorganized enterprises, the formal-informal interactions in product and factor 
markets have generated huge amount of research in recent years.  Interested readers may 
have a look at Funkhouser (1997a,b), Fields (1990), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), Kar 
and Marjit (2009), Maiti and Marjit (2008), Marjit and Kar (2009a, b, 2008, 2007), Marjit 
and Maiti (2007), Webster and Fidler (1996), etc., for country level empirical studies for 
South America, Asia, Africa and a few transition countries in Europe.  
One query at a theoretical level has been to explore whether market oriented 
reform process yields benefits for poor informal workers.  Studies by Kar and Marjit 
(2009), Marjit (2003), Marjit and Beladi (2008), Marjit, Kar and Acharyaa (2007), Marjit 
and Kar (2009, 2004, etc), deal with this and related topics.  Marjit (2003), Chaudhuri 
and Banerjee (2007), Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007) and Marjit and Kar (2009) 1 have used 
functional general equilibrium structures where unskilled workers, if deprived of a job in 
the formal sector at a relatively high administered or negotiated wage, fall back on the 
informal sector where wage is market determined.  These papers use the labor market 
framework developed by Carruth and Oswald (1981) and Agenor and Montiel (1996).  It 
is observed in most country studies that the informal sector is the largest employer of 
relatively unskilled workers when skill-biased technological changes in production of 
manufactured commodities and services have always facilitated income and employment 
growth for the highly skilled.  In fact, the increased requirement of technical expertise in 
                                                 
1 Also see, Chaudhuri (2003), Chaudhuri and Mukherjee (2002), etc.   
 3 
the work place has not only created an entry barrier for those who are not equipped with 
the same, but have also excluded many senior level workers previously considered 
productive at the firm level.2  In addition, the rising skilled wage has been responsible for 
a lower aggregate demand for skill, with many more workers settling for contractual and 
irregular job market profiles generally in the domain of unorganized sector.  The impact 
of such palpable changes is undoubtedly felt on the informal sector comprisi ng largely of 
non-traded goods.  Using such structures where labor mobility between the formal and 
the informal sector is substantial, several policy questions have been discussed in the 
above-mentioned papers. 
         In this paper we follow a similar framework to analyze the consequences of a drop          
in demand for a product manufactured with skilled labour and capital on the informal real 
wage.  This tries to answer the question whether recession in the skilled good sector is 
harmful for the unorganized or informal workers.  The paper has quite a few features 
consistent with the stylized features of a developing country.                  .  
          First, keeping in mind that large portion of the informal sector produces non -traded 
goods we argue that a recession in the skilled good sector has both supply and demand 
side impacts on the informal non-traded sector.  It is possible that capital relocation from 
the skilled sector due to recession actually increases production in the formal unskilled 
sector pulling labor away from the informal sector.  At the same time, demand squeeze 
has a negative impact on the informal sector.  We identify the key parameters, which will 
dictate the resulting movements in informal wage.  Such a recession may in fact rai se the 
informal wage, improving the real income of unskilled workers in both the formal and the 
informal sectors.  In a subsequent exercise, we show that if the output of the informal 
                                                 
2 See Card and DiNardo (2002) for example.   
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sector is also tradable in the international market, our conjecture on i nformal wage would 
still hold owing to a supply side shock alone.  Contraction in the skilled sector in the 
extended framework is corresponded by growth in the unskilled sector and wage 
increments in the informal sector, although the latter two sectors do not undergo any 
price or productivity shocks.   In a wider context, this would imply that countries with 
considerably large share of medium skilled and unskilled or informal sectors might not 
suffer too much from high-end global crisis of the nature described above.     
Section 2 describes the first model, section 3 offers the extension and results and 
section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Non-Traded Informal Commodity 
 Let there be three sectors in the economy: X produced with skilled workers (S, 
return Sw ) and capital ( 1K , return r) specific to the formal sector; Y produced with 
unskilled labor (L, return w ) and 1K ; and Z produced with L (return w) and capital of a 
different (informal) variety ( 2K , return R).  Apparently, sectors X and Y enjoy benefits 
receivable in formal labor markets and or wage protection from organized labor unions.  
As it is observed in the technologically advanced sectors in any country, the highly 
skilled workers receive a market-determined wage usually set at very high levels.  
Production functions face diminishing returns to factor inputs and the sectors exist in 
competitive market conditions.  Equations (1-3) represent competitive market conditions, 
where per unit cost is equal to per unit price of the commodity in question; ija ’s are 
input-output coefficients and jP ’s (j=X, Y) are world commodity prices that the small 
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country in question takes as given.  Equations (5-7) are full-employment conditions for 
factor inputs and equation (8) offers the equality between demand and supply of non -
traded good in equilibrium, where ZP , price of the non-traded good is endogenously 
determined.        
XXKSXS Praaw  1                    (1) 
YYKLY Praaw  1                           (2) 
 ZZKLZ PRawa  2                   (3) 
SXaSX                                                     (4) 
111 KYaXa YKXK                                      (5) 
22 KZa ZK                (6) 
LZaYa LZLY       (7) 
It is assumed that the consumers spend 10  share of their income on commodities 
and services supplied by the informal sector.  Thus, equality in the non-traded goods 
sector implies:    
ZPYPXP ZYX )1()(                  (8) 
We therefore have eight equations to solve for eight variables: Sw , r, w, R, 
ZandYXPZ ,, ;  
 
Basic Comparative Static 
A recession in sector X implies that there is a drop in the aggregate demand for the 
commodity with a resulting negative change in its price.  In algebraic terms, it implies 
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0ˆ XP , where, ‘^’ indicates a proportional change ( p
dpp ˆ ).  Sector Y that uses 
unskilled labor but exists under the umbrella of labor unions and therefore enjoys a wage 
premium above the market-clearing wage earned by equally skilled workers in sector Z, 
however, does not experience any direct fall in the price level.  Thus, 0ˆ YP , and we are 
interested in observing as to what happens to wˆ .   
Using (1) and (4) 
0ˆˆˆ 1  XXX
SX
XXK PPX 


    (9) 
Then using (5) and (6) 
0ˆ.ˆˆ
1
1  XYX
SXYK
XXK PPY 


   (10) 
Finally, using (7) 
0)ˆ(ˆˆ  X
ZLZ
YLY PRw

     (11) 
Substituting for YX ˆ,ˆ from above and ZLZZK waZ ˆˆˆ 2  from (6) on to the non-
traded commodity market equilibrium in equation (8) subjected to proportional change, 
and then using (11), we get 
0ˆ ZP , iff   )1(11 XXYLY
LYLZ
ZY 
 






    (12) 
where, 
ZP
XP
Z
X
X
  , 
SX
XKX
X 
  and 
SXKY
XKX
Y 
  .   
Note that for Y  very high or X  very low, 0ˆ XP .   
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Next we use equations (3) and (11), of which we know from (11) that, if 0ˆ xP , R
w  must 
go up.  At the same time, following (12), if ZP  goes up, then XYZ PPPw ˆˆ0ˆˆ  , and 
the real informal wage goes up in consequence. 
Therefore, one might argue that condition (12) is quite revealing.  As X contracts 
and capital leaves X to go Y, Z must also contract.  However, only a part of that 
contraction is a result of contraction in its own demand.  Hence, there is a net l oss in the 
supply of Z, accentuating a fall in ZP .   If 1z , i.e. the informal workers do not 
consume X and Y, such a positive effect will vanish from the LHS of (12).  
Higher Y  relative to X  and Y  relative to X will both push up ZP .  To see it 
cleanly let us suppose 1Z  and substitute for YX  ,  in (12).  It follows directly then,  
0ˆ YP  iff   XXYY   1     (13) 
or,   




SX
XKX
X
SXKY
XKX
Y 


 1  
or,    XKXSXXX
KY
KX
Y 
   




 KX
X
SX
X
KY
KX
Y 


     (14) 
            In other words, if elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the 
skilled sector ( X ) is very high, the contractionary effect in X and expansionary effect in 
Y will be quite large strengthening the case for contraction in Z and a rise in ZP . 
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3. Tradable Informal Commodity 
 Let us now consider the case where sector Z produces a traded commodity, ceteris 
paribus.  In other words, prices of all three commodities are now given internationally.  
The production structure remains same as before, except that equation (8) is no longer 
useful, since there are seven variables, Sw , r, w, R, ZandYX ,  to be determined directly 
from equations (1) – (7).   
It is now straightforward to argue that, in the event of a recession in sector X only and a 
consequent price cut, equation (1) yields 
ˆ
ˆ ( ) 0XS
SX
Pw

  ,   when ˆ 0XP      (15) 
Using (4) and (15), and differentiating equation (5) the following results:  
ˆˆ ( ) 0KX X X
KY SX
PY  
 
   when ˆ 0XP      (16) 
Now, from (6) 
ˆ ˆˆ( )LZ ZZ w R          (17) 
Differentiating (7), using (15) – (17) and simplifying we get, 
ˆ ˆˆ( ) ( )LY KX X X
LZ Z KY SX
w R P  
   
        (18) 
On the other hand, total differential of equation (3) yields  
ZZKLZ PRw  2ˆˆ        (19) 
Multiplying both sides of (18) by KZ and adding it with (19) we obtain 
ˆˆ ( ) 0KZ LY KX X X
LZ Z KY SX
w P   
   
   ,  when ˆ 0XP  .   (20) 
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As ˆ 0ZP  , from (20) it follows that ˆˆ 0 Zw P  .  So the informal wage, w, rises both in 
absolute and relative terms following a decrease in the price of the skilled sector 
commodity. 
The intuitive explanations are as follows.  A decrease in XP lowers the skilled 
wage, Sw , raises SXa and lowers KXa .  Sector X contracts, as skilled labour is specific to 
this sector.  It releases capital of type 1 which goes to sector Y causing it to expand.  An 
expansion of sector Y draws unskilled labour from sector Z thereby causing the informal 
wage, w , to increase. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 When the global financial markets pass through a long phase of recession, the 
effects are not contained in that sector alone.  Impacts of the downswing are often quickly 
felt in other markets and in the aggregate the spillovers lead to significant negative 
growth all over.  The much talked about recession in the housing market in the developed 
countries has now caused meltdown impact in every other sector of the local economies 
and it is natural to ask how deep the tremors would be felt in the developing world which 
are connected more than ever through trade and financial linkages.  What we find in this 
paper is somewhat unanticipated in the common wisdom.  We argue that since most 
developing and transition countries are repositories of large unorganized and/or informal 
sectors that deal largely with non-traded commodities and services and in some cases 
tradable goods as well, the global recession may not be able to penetrate very far into 
these economies.  In fact, we establish that a fall in the price of those commodities and 
services that employ white-collared workers may in fact turn out to be favorable for the 
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purveyors of non-traded goods in general and the informal sector in particular.  Thus, as 
sector Z contracts due to contraction in sector X and despite growth in sector Y, the unit 
price of that non-traded sector rises.  This is the prime source of increase in the nominal 
and consequently the real wages in the informal sector.  In the extended version even if 
the price of the non-traded sector is frozen from outside, still the expansion of the middle 
sector draws labor away from the informal producers and the market settles the wa ge at a 
higher level compared to the pre-recession period.  In brief, therefore, the theoretical 
possibility that recession in the skilled sector might even raise the wage of the informal 
workers appears quite robust.  As possible extension, in particular,  the vertical linkages in 
production between formal and informal sectors may be explored to lend further insight 
in similar frameworks.  The connections that income poverty of a large number of 
unskilled workers bear with the informal production and wage t herein may also generate 
testable hypotheses in theory and empirics.        
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